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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 In 2001, Randall Keith Shotts was sentenced to 30½ to 
133 years’ imprisonment in Westmoreland County, 
Pennsylvania.  Following a lengthy state collateral review 
process, during which Shotts was appointed five different 
counsel, he filed this petition for habeas corpus.  It alleges 
that his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance during 
plea negotiations, his guilty plea, and sentencing.  The 
District Court dismissed Shotts’ claim as procedurally 
defaulted.  
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 We disagree.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 
determination that Shotts’ claim was defaulted because he 
failed to raise it when first represented by new counsel was 
what we term an exorbitant application of an otherwise 
independent and adequate state rule.  As such, it cannot bar 
federal review of Shotts’ claim.    
 However, on the merits Shotts comes up short, as he 
has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.  We 
thus affirm the District Court’s judgment denying Shotts’ 
petition.  
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 A. Conviction and Sentencing 
 In 1999, the Westmoreland County District Attorney 
charged Shotts with offenses arising from a string of 
burglaries.  While in jail following his arrest, Shotts offered 
to assist the District Attorney’s office in an investigation into 
corruption at the Westmoreland County prison.  In exchange 
for his assistance, the District Attorney’s office helped secure 
Shotts’ release on bail.  Once released, Shotts engaged in 
another spree of crimes, and additional charges were filed in 
2000.  Ultimately, he was charged under twelve separate 
informations for offenses including burglary, theft, criminal 
mischief, criminal conspiracy, receiving stolen property, 
passing bad checks, criminal trespass, aggravated assault, 
simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person, and 
driving under the influence of alcohol.  (Shotts was also 
charged with probation violations in three earlier cases, but 
no additional sentence was added for these violations.)     
 Attorney Brian Aston represented Shotts in connection 
with all of the charges from the time of Shotts’ preliminary 
hearing through his sentencing.  Because Shotts had made 
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substantial confessions to the police, he and Aston agreed that 
the case should not go to trial, and Aston pursued a plea deal 
with the Commonwealth.  He apparently did not request 
discovery of police records or copies of Shotts’ statements to 
the police.   
 The Commonwealth offered Aston a plea deal that 
would have resulted in a sentence of ten to twenty years’ 
imprisonment.  On hearing this, Judge Richard E. 
McCormick, Jr., who was presiding over the case, 
commented that the offered sentence seemed high, given 
Shotts’ assistance with the prison corruption investigation.  
Aston reported the offer and the Judge’s statement to Shotts.  
He rejected the plea deal and entered a general guilty plea 
without an agreement with the Commonwealth.  In a plea 
colloquy before the Court, Shotts confirmed that his lawyer 
had explained all of the charges and all of the maximum 
sentences, that he was pleading without an agreement with 
the Commonwealth, and that the Court could impose “the 
various sentences upon these general pleas.”  App. at 127–28.  
Sentencing was delayed to allow for a presentence 
investigation report and for Shotts to present evidence of his 
participation in the corruption investigation.  As to the latter, 
Judge McCormick told the parties that he knew about Shotts’ 
assistance, but needed evidence to consider that as a factor for 
sentencing purposes.   
 Despite hearing evidence of Shotts’ cooperation in the 
corruption investigation and notwithstanding his earlier 
statement that ten to twenty years’ imprisonment seemed 
high, Judge McCormick sentenced Shotts to an aggregate 
30½ to 133 years’ imprisonment.  This disparity resulted in 
part from the Judge’s limited information about Shotts’ 
participation in the corruption investigation at the time of his 
earlier statement and in part because the Judge meted out 
sentences for each information separately without calculating 
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the aggregate sentence he was imposing.  Having doled out 
sentences for each offense, he explained: “Frankly, it’s going 
to take a calculator for somebody to sit down now and 
calculate up the total amount of years consecutively 
[imposed],” and reported that “the clerk will have it . . . at 
some point in time today.”  App. at 199.  Judge McCormick 
then discussed the factors that justified the sentence.  He 
described Shotts’ lengthy criminal history, his drug abuse, his 
participation in the prison investigation, and his substantial 
criminal activity after his release on bail.  Shotts filed a 
motion for reconsideration,
1
 which the Court denied except to 
change one sentence from one to two years’ imprisonment to 
nine to eighteen months.  This change had no effect on 
Shotts’ overall time of imprisonment because that sentence 
ran concurrent to other sentences imposed.   
 At the resentencing hearing, Aston informed the Court 
that Shotts wished to file a direct appeal and make a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel against him.  Aston was 
permitted to withdraw, and the Court informed Shotts that 
new counsel would be appointed.  The Court appointed Leslie 
Uncapher.  She never learned about the appointment, as she 
had withdrawn her name from availability for court 
appointment prior to being assigned to Shotts’ case.  Shotts’ 
                                              
1
 For reasons unexplained in the record, this reconsideration 
motion omitted three of Shotts’ twelve cases.  Because those 
convictions were not raised in the resentencing motion, the 
time to file a state collateral challenge to those convictions 
expired earlier than the others, and Shotts’ challenges were 
dismissed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court as procedurally 
defaulted.  Shotts does not contest before us the District 
Court’s holding that his challenge to the conviction and 
sentence in those cases was procedurally defaulted in state 
court, and thus federal review is unavailable.   
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deadline to file a direct appeal expired on August 16, 2001, 
without an appeal being filed.  In September 2001, the order 
appointing Uncapher was vacated and James Michael was 
appointed counsel.  Although Michael was instructed to file a 
direct appeal, he took no action on the case.   
 B. Shotts’ Collateral Challenge 
 In July 2002, Shotts filed a pro se petition under 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).  He 
claimed seventeen errors, including that both Aston and 
Michael rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  Due to a 
series of hearings and appeals on issues of timeliness, Shotts’ 
PCRA claim was not heard on the merits by a PCRA Court 
until 2007.  During that time, three additional counsel—
Rachel Morocco, Sharon Wigle, and Patricia Elliot—were 
appointed to represent Shotts.  Morocco and Elliot filed 
amended PCRA petitions on Shotts’ behalf.   
 All of Shotts’ PCRA petitions raised a claim of 
ineffectiveness against Aston.  None of the petitions included 
a claim against Uncapher.  Only Shotts, in his pro se petition, 
raised a claim against Michael.  
 On April 18, 2007, Judge Rita Donovan Hathaway, 
presiding at the “PCRA Court,” held a hearing to consider 
Shotts’ ineffectiveness claim against Aston.  He and Shotts 
both testified.  Crediting Aston’s testimony and finding 
Shotts’ testimony not credible, Judge Hathaway found that 
Shotts’ plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that 
Aston provided effective representation as counsel in his 
advice to Shotts before and during the plea and sentencing.  
She thus denied all PCRA relief. 
 On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Shotts 
argued that the PCRA Court erred.  Specifically, he claimed 
7 
 
that Aston failed (1) to obtain any discovery prior to the plea, 
(2) to advise Shotts properly of the possible range of 
sentences, (3) by wrongly encouraging Shotts to enter a 
general guilty plea, and (4) not to object to the filing of 
separate criminal informations.   
 The Superior Court affirmed the denial of relief, but on 
a different ground.  It held that Shotts’ claim against Aston 
was defaulted.  Under Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 
687 (Pa. 1977), a petitioner waives an ineffectiveness claim if 
it is not raised by the first counsel who represents him after 
the allegedly ineffective counsel.  We call this the “Hubbard 
rule.”  It was violated here because counsel following 
Aston—technically Uncapher, but in practical effect 
Michael—did not raise any claim of Aston’s ineffectiveness.   
 Even if subsequent counsel does not raise an 
effectiveness claim, under Hubbard a later counsel may still 
raise the claim by “layering” ineffectiveness claims against 
counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 733 
(Pa. 2002) (“In the aftermath of Hubbard, the only way to 
consider claims related to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness that 
were not raised on direct appeal by new counsel was to plead 
and prove the additional claim of appellate counsel’s 
ineffectiveness, i.e., a layered claim of ineffectiveness.”).  
Shotts could have gotten at the ineffectiveness of Aston by 
claiming that each successive attorney was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the prior attorney’s failure to raise the 
claim (i.e., Uncapher was ineffective for not raising Aston’s 
ineffectiveness, Michael was ineffective for not raising 
Uncapher’s ineffectiveness, etc.).  See Commonwealth v. 
McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1021–22 (Pa. 2003) (explaining 
layered claims).  The Superior Court held that Shotts did not 
preserve this claim.  “[He] did not include a challenge to 
counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file either a direct 
appeal or a motion to withdraw his plea in any of his pro se or 
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amended PCRA petitions.”  App. at 79 (emphases in 
original).   
 On that alternate and procedural basis, the Superior 
Court concluded that it was “constrained to affirm the order 
of the trial court dismissing [Shotts’] petition for PCRA 
relief,” and that “[his] only recourse appears to be in the 
federal court system.”  Id. at 79–80.  Shotts’ petition for 
allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.  
 C. Shotts’ Habeas Petition 
 Shotts filed a pro se habeas claim in federal court.  He 
alleged constitutional violations that included ineffective 
assistance of his plea counsel—a deprivation of his Sixth 
Amendment right.
2
  Magistrate Judge Mitchell dismissed 
Shotts’ petition.  He determined that Shotts’ claim of  
ineffectiveness was barred as procedurally defaulted due to 
the Hubbard rule, an independent and adequate state 
procedural rule.  Shotts filed a timely notice of appeal and 
request for certificate of appealability.   
                                              
2
 Shotts also alleged three additional errors: (1) failure of the 
trial court to give him proper credit for time served; (2) an 
illegal sentence for lack of jurisdiction; and (3) a violation of 
his Fifth Amendment right to due process.  Judge Mitchell 
determined that these claims were never presented to a state 
court, and thus federal review was barred.  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(1)(A).  Shotts does not contest this default, and has 
not demonstrated cause or prejudice, or a miscarriage of 
justice, sufficient to excuse this default.  Cristin v. Brennan, 
281 F.3d 404, 414 (3d Cir. 2002). We did not grant a 
certificate of appealability on these claims and do not 
consider them here.   
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 We granted a certificate of appealability on whether 
the Superior Court’s determination that Shotts waived his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Aston was an 
“exorbitant application” of the Hubbard rule, and, if we could 
consider the claim, whether Shotts was denied effective 
assistance of counsel based on allegations that Aston failed to 
conduct any pre-plea discovery and did not advise Shotts of 
the maximum amount of prison time he could receive.  
II. Procedural Default 
 The adequacy of a state procedural bar is a question of 
federal law, which we review de novo.  Lee v. Kemna, 534 
U.S. 362, 375 (2002); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 713 
(3d Cir. 2004).  
 A. Permissibility of Federal Review 
 Generally, federal courts will not consider an issue 
raised in a habeas petition if it was rejected by a state court 
and “the decision of the state court rests on a state law ground 
that is independent of the federal question and adequate to 
support the judgment.”  Kemna, 534 U.S. at 375 (alterations 
and emphasis omitted).  We look to the face of the opinion to 
determine if the state court “clearly and expressly” states that 
it relied on a state ground separate from the federal issues.  
See Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 333 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 733 (1991)).  
A state ground is “adequate” if it is “firmly established and 
regularly followed.”  Walker v. Martin, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. 
Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 
53, 60–61 (2009)); Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 317 (3d 
Cir. 2012).   
 To repeat, the Pennsylvania Superior Court dismissed 
Shotts’ ineffectiveness claim because of the Hubbard rule.  
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The parties agree that it is independent of the federal 
constitutional issue of ineffectiveness of counsel and, at the 
time it was applied, was firmly established and regularly 
followed by Pennsylvania courts.  Trevino v. Thaler, ___ U.S. 
___, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013) (“[A] conviction that rests 
upon a defendant’s state law ‘procedural default’ (for 
example, the defendant’s failure to raise a claim of error at 
the time or in the place that state law requires) . . . normally 
rests upon an independent and adequate state ground.” 
(quotation omitted)).  Hubbard was overturned by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Grant, 813 A.2d at 738, but 
Hubbard continued to apply to cases—like Shotts’—
“currently pending on collateral review.”  Id. at 739 n.16.  
Under Grant, “as a general rule, a petitioner should wait to 
raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until 
collateral review.”  Id. at 738.   
 B. The Exorbitant Application Exception 
 The Supreme Court, however, recognized a narrow 
exception to this procedural bar to federal review in Lee v. 
Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).  In “exceptional cases . . . 
exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the 
state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal 
rule.”  Id. at 376.  In Lee, a criminal defendant moved for a 
delay of his trial when he discovered that his three alibi 
witnesses could not be found in the courthouse though they 
had been present earlier in the day.  Id. at 369.  His motion 
failed, as the court cited its limited availability and the 
appearance that the witnesses had abandoned Lee.  Id. at 370.  
Lee did not present any defense witnesses and was convicted.  
On collateral attack, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed 
the denial of his petition for relief.  Id. at 372.  It held that 
Lee’s challenge was defaulted because he did not comply 
with a state rule that motions for delay in trial must be made 
in writing and accompanied by an affidavit.  Id. at 372–73.  A 
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federal district court and court of appeals held that this was an 
adequate and independent state law ground barring federal 
review.  Id. at 374.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
adherence to this technical requirement was an exorbitant 
application of Missouri’s rule.  Id. at 376.   
 “Three considerations, in combination,” led the Court 
“to conclude that this case [fell] within the small category of 
cases in which [otherwise adequate] asserted state grounds 
are inadequate to block adjudication of a federal claim.”  Id. 
at 381.  First, the procedural requirement was not invoked at 
Lee’s trial, and his perfect compliance with the rule would not 
have altered the outcome.  Id.  The trial court denied the 
continuance for scheduling reasons.  Second, there was no 
case law that directed flawless compliance with the rule in the 
unique circumstances of his case.  Id. at 382.  Third, “and 
most important,” id., Lee substantially complied with the 
“essential requirements” of the rule, which were intended to 
provide information to the trial court and opposing party.  Id. 
at 385.  That Lee’s prior written motions related to these 
witnesses, and he had a clear trial strategy to rely on their 
alibi testimony, notified the trial court and opposing counsel 
of all that was needed to rule on the motion.   
 Thus, “[e]ven if a state rule itself is adequate, the 
‘exorbitant application’ of the rule may in exceptional cases 
render the state ground inadequate to erect a procedural bar.”  
Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 657 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Lee, 534 U.S. at 376).  As the procedural 
default bar is grounded in a policy of comity and federalism 
that gives deference to a state’s resolution of its criminal 
trials, if the state rule applied serves “no perceivable state 
interest,” it need not bar our review.  Lee, 534 U.S. at 378. 
 The three considerations relied on by the Lee Court are 
not so much a test as they are “guideposts,” Cotto v. Herbert, 
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331 F.3d 217, 240 (2d Cir. 2003), that are helpful in 
“evaluat[ing] the state interest in a procedural rule against the 
circumstances of a particular case.”  Lee, 534 U.S. at 381; see 
also Monroe v. Kuhlman, 433 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(deeming application of contemporaneous objection rule as 
exorbitant even though the first and third factors did not favor 
the petitioner).  The Lee considerations are strongly tied to the 
facts of that case, where the alleged default occurred during a 
criminal trial.  Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 391 (2d Cir. 
2008) (noting that the Lee guideposts are “obviously rooted in 
the context of procedural defaults at trial, and are so 
formulated”).  Here, where the default occurred when Shotts 
failed to raise a claim on appeal, we consider the Lee factors 
as helpful guidance but also consider the overall relevant 
circumstances in our case.  
 As did the Supreme Court in Lee, we believe that a 
number of exceptional considerations, in combination, lead us 
to conclude that the Superior Court’s application of the 
Hubbard rule in this case was exorbitant.  Over the course of 
nine years and five appointed counsel, Shotts consistently 
raised his claim that Aston provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The PCRA Court considered Shotts’ claim on the 
merits and held an evidentiary hearing to consider Aston’s 
representation.  Shotts had no opportunity to correct the 
procedural default spawned by Hubbard before the Superior 
Court sua sponte invoked it to dismiss his PCRA petition.  
Moreover, because Shotts’ claim reached the Superior Court 
on the merits, there is no state interest in applying the 
procedural rule at that point. 
 Shotts first raised his allegation that Aston provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing.  
Indeed, Shotts’ desire to pursue this claim was the reason 
Aston was permitted to withdraw as counsel.  The Court 
informed Shotts that new counsel would be appointed so that 
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he could pursue this claim.  However, Uncapher—the first 
new counsel appointed to Shotts—had removed her name 
from the court appointment list and was never informed about 
the assignment.  It is not clear that Shotts even knew of 
Uncapher’s appointment.  By the time the Court vacated her 
appointment, Shotts’ time to file a direct appeal had expired.  
Michael—Shotts’ next attorney—appointed after his time to 
file a direct appeal had expired, also took no efforts on 
Shotts’ behalf despite his request, both before the Court and 
in letters he sent to Michael, to file an appeal alleging Aston’s 
ineffectiveness.   
 Shotts then raised his claim challenging Aston’s 
representation in his pro se PCRA petition.  At the moment 
he made this claim in 2002, it was technically defaulted under 
Hubbard because he had not challenged Aston’s 
representation when he was represented by Uncapher, or 
Uncapher’s representation when he was represented by 
Michael.  This default went unmentioned by the 
Commonwealth or the PCRA Court until the Superior Court’s 
decision in 2010 when it ended Shotts’ petition for collateral 
relief because of this procedural requirement.   
 The first factor the Lee Court considered was that the 
trial court ruled on the merits of Lee’s motion to postpone his 
trial, not the procedural bar later invoked by the state 
appellate court.  In Shotts’ case, as in Lee, “perfect 
compliance with the state rule” would not have changed the 
outcome during the earlier state proceeding.  Cotto, 331 F.3d 
at 240; see Lee, 534 U.S. at 381.  The PCRA Court treated his 
claim as properly raised, and it considered the merits of the 
ineffectiveness claim.  It held an evidentiary hearing (where 
Aston and Shotts both testified), and issued an opinion and 
judgment.  If Shotts had completely complied with the 
Hubbard rule, the PCRA Court would have taken the exact 
course.  
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 The Supreme Court also considered in Lee whether a 
published Missouri state court decision “direct[ed] flawless 
compliance” with the state rule at issue.  Id. at 382.  Beyond 
noting the “sudden [and] unanticipated” events that arose 
during Lee’s trial, the Court pointed out that the rule offered 
the chance to cure any defect, yet Lee was not given that 
opportunity.  Id.  “If either prosecutor or judge considered 
supplementation of Lee’s motion necessary, they likely would 
have alerted the defense at the appropriate time, and Lee 
would have had an opportunity to perfect his plea.”  Id. at 
380.   
 The same is true for Shotts.  Under the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a “defective” PCRA petition 
can be amended.  Pa. R. Crim. P. Rule 905.  “This rule 
indicates the desire of this Court to provide PCRA petitioners 
with a legitimate opportunity to present their claims to the 
PCRA court in a manner sufficient to avoid dismissal due to a 
correctable defect in claim pleading or presentation.” 
Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1024 (Pa. 2003).  
Shotts could have reached Aston’s ineffectiveness by layering 
ineffectiveness claims against his later counsel who failed to 
raise the issue properly.  Id. at 1024 (citing Rule 905 as 
applicable in cases “where the petitioner has failed to 
preserve, by pleading and/or presenting, a layered 
ineffectiveness claim in a manner sufficient to warrant merits 
review”).  But no one alerted Shotts during the years in 
litigation of this case—which included three PCRA counsel 
and two amended PCRA petitions—so he could perfect his 
ineffectiveness claim.  When the Superior Court sua sponte 
raised the procedural default, he did not have the opportunity 
to cure.   
 Moreover, Shotts arguably attempted to raise a layered 
claim in his pro se petition.  As noted, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court stated that he “did not include a challenge to 
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counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file either a direct 
appeal or a motion to withdraw his plea in any of his pro se or 
amended PCRA petitions.”  App. at 79 (emphases in 
original).  But Shotts’ listed Michael’s ineffectiveness in his 
pro se  PCRA petition.  See id. at 16 (“Atty James Michael 
has provided ineffective counsel since 2000 [sic], when he 
was appointed.”); id. at 17 (“James Michael – Did nothing for 
me, was completely useless as an attorney.”).  At the time, the 
Pennsylvania Courts had not defined the requirements of a 
layered ineffectiveness claim.  Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 
A.2d 1125, 1139 (Pa. 2009) (“[O]ur Court in McGill 
acknowledged that the manner of properly layering a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel had been unclear and 
clarified the procedure for presenting layered claims.”).  If the 
Superior Court meant that Shotts’ pro se layered claim was 
not properly pled, we would deem that to be an exorbitant 
application of Hubbard’s layering requirement.  It would 
“inject an Alice-in-Wonderland quality into the proceedings,” 
Lee, 534 U.S. at 383, to require a pro se litigant to know how 
properly to layer an ineffectiveness claim when the highest 
court in the Commonwealth was still struggling with the 
issue. 
 We recognize that the Hubbard rule—prior to being 
overturned—was “unbending,” Grant, 813 A.2d at 733, a 
factor that weighs against Shotts.  But we also consider the 
unusual “circumstances presented,” Cotto, 331 F.3d at 240, 
that in this case include what the Commonwealth deems an 
“admittedly horrendous history.”  Appellee Br. at 11.  Having 
been sentenced to what could effectively be a lifetime of 
imprisonment, Shotts understood counsel would be appointed 
to pursue a direct appeal and claim against Aston.  Neither 
Uncapher or Michael filed a direct appeal.  The issue was 
raised again in Shotts’ PCRA petition.  Years of delay 
followed, which included failures of multiple counsel to file 
timely motions and briefs.  The Commonwealth has presented 
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no case, nor has our research revealed one, where a 
Pennsylvania court relied on a default under Hubbard in 
similar circumstances.   
 Turning to the third, and “most important,” Lee 
consideration, 534 U.S. at 382, we discern no state interest 
served by applying the Hubbard rule in this case.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the rule serves an important state 
interest in the finality of judgments and preservation of 
judicial resources.  How state interests were promoted here 
evades us.  The rule’s “essential requirement” that the claim 
be raised at the earliest possible time was met by Shotts’ 
request at resentencing and continued pursuit of this claim 
during the PCRA process.  Id. at 385.  His ineffectiveness 
claim—and desire to challenge the finality of his sentence on 
that ground—was clear from the time of his resentencing.  It 
was litigated for years.  Ultimately, the facts at issue were 
developed in the PCRA Court and presented to the Superior 
Court for appellate review.  Dismissing at the Superior Court 
does not “promote judicial economy [or] the orderly 
administration of the appellate process.”  Hubbard, 372 A.2d 
at 695 n.6 (quotation omitted).  “Where it is inescapable that 
the defendant sought to invoke the substance of his federal 
right, the asserted state-law defect in form must be more 
evident than it is here.”  Lee, 534 U.S. at 385 (quotation 
omitted).  
 The combination of these factors “lead[s] us to 
question the applicability of this body” of state law.  Whitley 
v. Ercole, 642 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2011).  We believe that 
the Superior Court’s application of the Hubbard rule in this 
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case was exorbitant, and does not bar federal review of 
Shotts’ claimed ineffectiveness of plea counsel.3    
IV. Ineffectiveness of Counsel 
We certified for appeal two aspects of Shotts’ 
ineffectiveness claim—(1) Aston’s alleged failure to conduct 
an investigation or discovery prior to Shotts’ guilty plea, and 
(2) his alleged failure to advise Shotts of the maximum 
sentence available.   
A.  Standard of Review  
 Decisions on the merits by a state court are afforded 
deference under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We will 
reverse only if the court’s determinations “(1) resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law . . .  or (2) 
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”  § 2254(d).  If a state court does 
not review a claim on the merits, we review the claim de 
novo.  Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 2012).   
                                              
3
 Federal courts can also review procedurally defaulted claims 
if the petitioner can show “cause for the default and prejudice 
from a violation of federal law.”  Trevino v. Thaler, ___ U.S. 
___, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013) (quotation omitted); 
Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–19 
(2012).  Because of the path taken to resolve this case, we do 
not need to consider this other exception, for which we did 
not issue a certificate of appealability or have the benefit of 
briefing.   
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The parties agree that we should apply AEDPA 
deference to Shotts’ allegation that Aston failed to inform him 
of the possible sentences because the PCRA Court considered 
this claim and issued a ruling on the merits.  Appellant Br. at 
51; Appellee Br. at 16.  The Commonwealth argues for 
similar deference in Shotts’ allegation that Aston was 
ineffective for failing to conduct discovery because the PCRA 
Court discussed the merits of this claim, though ultimately 
ruling it was waived.  App. at 69 n.5.  Deference is not owed 
in this case, however, because there was no decision on the 
merits.   
 “For the purposes of Section 2254(d), a claim has 
been ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings’ 
when a state court has made a decision that 1) finally resolves 
the claim, and 2) resolves th[at] claim on the basis of its 
substance, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.”  
Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  The 
PCRA Court’s decision did not finally resolve Shotts’ claim 
because the later Superior Court decision “stripped the PCRA 
court’s substantive determination . . . of preclusive effect.”  
Id.  The appellate decision is procedure-based, and thus does 
not reach the merits.  Id.  With the PCRA Court’s ruling 
stripped of preclusive value, “AEDPA deference is not due.”  
Id.  We review Shotts’ claim de novo.  In this case, however, 
the standard of review makes little difference.  Under either 
standard, Shotts has not demonstrated ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  
 B. Claims Against Plea Counsel 
 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a 
defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel 
and prejudice.”  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 
(2009); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Performance is deficient if counsel’s efforts “fell below an 
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objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing 
professional norms.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  “A court 
considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a 
‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within 
the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.  The 
challenger’s burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’” 
Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–89). 
To demonstrate prejudice, “a defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see Wright v. Van Patten, 552 
U.S. 120, 124 (2008).  At the plea stage, prejudice “focuses 
on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance 
affected the outcome of the plea process.”  Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).    
 1. Alleged Failure to Obtain Discovery 
Shotts alleges that Aston was ineffective for failing to 
conduct discovery—including obtaining police reports and 
records—prior to advising his client to plead guilty.  A 
counsel’s “strategic choices made after thorough investigation 
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable. . . . [C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 690–91.   
We cannot conclude that failing to obtain discovery in 
this context fell below an objective standard of 
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reasonableness.  Aston made a reasonable strategic choice in 
light of Shotts’ “pretty substantial confession” and his wish to 
avoid trial.  App. at 235.  Aston’s preliminary investigation 
governed his choice to pursue a plea agreement and then to 
try to obtain a favorable sentence following a general guilty 
plea.  The facts here do not demonstrate deficient 
performance.   
As for prejudice, no allegation exists that evidence in 
these records would have aided plea negotiations or reduced 
the charges or sentence Shotts faced.  His only allegation is 
that Aston would have been better prepared to advise him 
during the plea and sentencing if Aston had obtained 
discovery.  That fails to show “a reasonable probability 
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
2.  Alleged Failure to Advise About 
Sentencing 
 Shotts contends also that Aston was ineffective 
because he failed to inform Shotts of the maximum sentence 
he could receive.  No one disputes that Aston told Shotts the 
maximum sentence available for each offense, but did not 
calculate the total possible sentence available if the Court’s 
sentence for each count ran consecutively.  Although Aston 
never provided a total sentence that Shotts could face in the 
worst-case scenario, he told Shotts that “if everything runs 
consecutive this is going to get to be a very large number very 
quick.”  App. at 248, 247, 264.  Shotts knew that the Judge 
had discretion to impose various sentences and that he had no 
sentencing agreement with the Commonwealth when he pled 
guilty.  Aston and Shotts expected the sentence to be far 
lower than Shotts received, but Aston did not make any 
promises to Shotts about his sentence.   
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 In the context of a guilty plea, counsel is required to 
give a defendant information sufficient “to make a reasonably 
informed decision whether to accept a plea offer.”  United 
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992).  In effect, 
Shotts asks us to hold that his decision is only reasonably 
informed if counsel has provided an exact number or close 
estimate of the maximum sentencing exposure.  We decline to 
do so.  Aston informed Shotts of the maximum sentence for 
each offense and that the aggregate sentence could increase 
quickly if the Judge chose to run those sentences 
consecutively—something Shotts understood the Judge had 
the discretion to do.  Aston provided sufficient information 
for Shotts to make a reasonably informed decision to plead 
guilty.    
Even if Shotts could show deficient performance, he 
could not demonstrate prejudice.  “In the context of pleas a 
defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would 
have been different with competent advice.”  Lafler v. 
Cooper, ___ U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).  If a 
defendant rejects a plea, he must show that “but for counsel’s 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability he and 
the trial court would have accepted the guilty plea” and the 
resulting sentence would have been lower.  Id. at 1391; see 
United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546–47 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154–55 (3d Cir. 1999).   
Shotts asserts he was prejudiced because he refused 
the ten-to-twenty-year plea deal and entered a constitutionally 
invalid plea on the basis of Aston’s deficient performance.  
We disagree.  Shotts believed that the plea offer was too high 
and that he would receive a lower sentence.  In light of his 
prior convictions, as well as Judge McCormick’s statement 
that the plea offer of ten to twenty years seemed high, this 
may have been a reasonable expectation.  Shotts knew the 
possibilities when he rejected the plea deal.  We cannot now 
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say there is a reasonable probability he would have taken the 
plea deal if Aston had acted as Shotts suggests.
4
 
* * * * * 
In the exceptional circumstances of this case, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s application of the Hubbard 
rule was exorbitant and does not bar federal review.  When 
we consider Shotts’ claim on the merits, however, we 
conclude that he has not demonstrated Aston’s 
ineffectiveness.  Thus we affirm the District Court’s judgment 
denying Shotts’ petition for habeas corpus. 
 
                                              
4
 We pause to note our concern with the sentencing judge’s 
actions in this case—both offering an opinion on the plea deal 
and imposing a sentence without calculating the aggregate 
incarceration that resulted (unless the pre-sentence calculation 
could only result in a sentence of life imprisonment, not 
necessarily the case here).  Nonetheless, given the posture of 
this case and the limitations embedded in habeas review of a 
state court judgment, these are not grounds for relief.  Aston’s 
performance was not deficient because he failed to account 
for the sentencing judge’s unconventional behavior. 
